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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(c) as this case constitutes an appeal from 
Spanish Fork Circuit Court on a civil matter. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Whether, as part of his disaffirmance of a contract made 
during his minority, Defendant is required to compensate 
Plaintiff for the depreciation and/or use-value of the property 
which formed the basis for that contract? 
As this issue is a question of law--i.e., whether Utah law 
requires a disaffirming minor to return the adult party to his 
pre-contractual status--this Court will review the lower court's 
decision for correctness, applying a de novo review in which no 
deference is granted to the trial court's ruling. Ron Case 
Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382 
(Utah 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The sole determinative statute in the present case is Utah 
Code Annotated Section 15-2-2, and is set forth verbatim in the 
Appendix at A-l. 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
This case involves an action on a contractual debt by 
Plaintiff/Appellee against Defendant/Appellant despite 
Defendant's prior disaffirmance of the contract as one made 
during his minority. This appeal is from a granting of summary 
judgment in behalf of Plaintiff against Defendant by the 
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Honorable Judge John C. Backlund, Fourth Circuit Court, State of 
Utah, Utah County, Spanish Fork Department, awarding Plaintiff an 
amount equivalent with the depreciation of the subject-matter 
property, $1,160.00, plus interest and court costs. 
BACKGROUND FACTS 
Defendant/Appellant contracted with Plaintiff/Appellee for 
the purchase of a 1974 Ford truck on October 5, 1990, while he 
was yet a minor. Plaintiff's Complaint at 1 (see Appendix at A-
2) . At the time of the contract, Plaintiff received $640 from 
Defendant, with an additional $1,860 to be due three months later 
on January 1, 1991. Id. Later, as all parties have already 
agreed, Defendant appropriately disaffirmed his contract with 
Plaintiff. Id. at 2 (Appendix at A-3); see also Ruling of the 
Court (Appendix at A-8). Despite Defendant's disaffirmance of 
said contract, however, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against 
Defendant on May 13, 1991, seeking that the contract be enforced, 
or in the alternative, that Plaintiff be compensated for the 
depreciation and/or use-value of the truck while the truck was in 
Defendant's possession. Plaintiff claims that the truck had 
depreciated to a value of $700 at the time of disaffirmance and 
therefore sought $1,160 in damages, which is equal to the sum 
due, $1,860, less the $700 residual value of the truck. 
Plaintiff Motion For Summary Judgment at 4 (Appendix at A-7). 
Negotiations between Plaintiff's attorney and Defendant's 
attorney ensued for some time after Plaintiff's Complaint was 
filed, until Defendant filed a Motion For Summary Judgment And 
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Return Of Garnished Wages on January 26, 1993. No response was 
had on this Motion until Plaintiff's attorney filed his own 
Motion For Summary Judgment on April 1, 1993, requesting that 
Plaintiff be compensated for the diminished value of the truck at 
the time of its return to Plaintiff. Circuit Court Judge John C. 
Backlund issued a Ruling granting Plaintiff's Motion For Summary 
Judgment on April 12, 1993. Judge Backlund held as follows: 
The Court finds there is no genuine dispute 
as to plaintiff's claim for damages in the 
sum of $1,160.00. While defendant, being a 
minor, exercised his right to disaffirm the 
contract, he violated his obligation to 
promptly return the vehicle in as good a 
condition as when he received it. This he 
failed to do. 
See Appendix at A-8. It is from this Ruling and ensuing Order 
granting Plaintiff $1,160 plus costs and interest that Defendant 
appeals. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The only dispute before this Court is whether Defendant is 
responsible for returning Plaintiff to Plaintiff's pre-
contractual status. Defendant is not so liable. Despite the 
fact that other states may have gone in other directions, Utah 
statutory and case law unequivocally holds that a minor is not 
liable to the adult party of a contract for the depreciation 
and/or use-value of the property which formed the subject matter 
for the contract. Therefore, in the present case, Defendant 
cannot be held liable to Plaintiff for the depreciation of the 
truck which Defendant had contracted to buy from Plaintiff. 
Instead, Defendant is actually entitled to a return of the 
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consideration which he paid Plaintiff as a down-payment on the 
truck. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT APPROPRIATELY DISAFFIRMED HIS CONTRACT 
WITH PLAINTIFF. 
It is clear from the record that Defendant has appropriately 
disaffirmed his contract with Plaintiff. The requirements for 
disaffirmance pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 15-2-2 are 
simple and have been met by Defendant in the present case. In 
order to disaffirm, a minor must (1) disaffirm the contract (2) 
in a reasonable time and (3) restore to the other party all money 
or property received by him by virtue of the contract and 
remaining within his control. These requirements, as is clear 
from Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment and the Court's 
Ruling, have been met in the present case. 
Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment does not raise the 
issue of ineffective disaffirmance. Instead, Plaintiff's Motion 
admits, 
All facts related above are not disputed by 
either party. The Defendant was a minor when 
he entered into the contract, and disaffirmed 
before the age of majority. However, in this 
matter, the Defendant obtained the use of a 
vehicle without revealing his age to the 
Plaintiff, utilized that vehicle, damaged the 
vehicle, and when the vehicle was no longer 
operative, attempted to escape his 
responsibility. 
Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment at 2 (see Appendix at A-
5). Thus Plaintiff's claim assumes effective disaffirmance and 
claims that, despite the disaffirmance, Defendant remains liable 
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for the depreciation and/or the value of the vehicle's use during 
Defendant's possession of that vehicle. 
The lower court's logic is a little more difficult to 
follow, but it nevertheless makes clear that no dispute exists as 
to whether Defendant complied with the Utah Code Annotated 
Section 15-2-2 in his disaffirmance. The court stated that, 
ff[w]hile defendant, being a minor, exercised his right to 
disaffirm the contract, he violated his obligation to promptly 
return the vehicle in as good a condition as when he received 
it." See Appendix at A-8. Thus the lower court likewise found 
that Defendant appropriately "exercised his right to disaffirm 
the contract" but agreed with Plaintiff that Defendant had a duty 
to return Plaintiff to his pre-contract status. 
As the decision granting Plaintiff's Motion For Summary 
Judgment, from which this appeal is made, is based solely on 
Defendant's alleged duty to return Plaintiff to his pre-
contractual status, that is the sole issue before this Court. 
And, as will be shown, such a duty imposed upon a disaffirming 
minor is in direct contravention to Utah law. 
POINT II 
THE ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT GOES AGAINST 
ESTABLISHED UTAH LAW. 
As already mentioned, the lower court imposed upon Defendant 
a duty to "return the vehicle in as good a condition as when he 
received it." See Appendix at A-8. Clearly, however, the Utah 
Legislature has opted to not impose such a duty. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 15-2-2 permits a minor to 
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disaffirm contracts that are not for necessaries and thereafter 
not be held thereto. This section imposes an obligation upon the 
minor to "restore[] to the other party all money or property 
received by him by virtue of said contracts and remaining within 
his control at any time after attaining his majority." U.C.A. § 
15-2-2 (emphasis added). Thus the statute clearly requires only 
that the property remaining within the minor's control be 
returned to the other party. In the present case, Defendant 
complied with this requirement when he returned the truck to 
Plaintiff. However, this requirement was apparently read and 
understood by the lower court as imposing a duty upon the minor 
to restore all property in its original condition. This is 
simply not the case. In fact, such a reading of the statute 
effectively renders the disaffirming right nugatory. 
Contrary to the lower court's ruling, the Utah Supreme Court 
has held that under Utah's statute a minor may disaffirm his 
contracts even if the property he has received has become 
worthless and the return thereof does not make the other party 
whole. Blake v. Harding, 54 Utah 158, 180 P. 172 (1919). The 
Blake court continued by stating that to hold that a minor may 
not "disaffirm and recover if the property he has received has 
become worthless . . . is to impose the duty upon the infant to 
place the other party to the contract in exact status quo. To so 
hold is to disregard and misapply the purpose of the law." 180 
P. at 174. Consequently, Blake held, a disaffirming minor is not 
required to compensate the adult party for any losses the adult 
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may have suffered as a result of the disaffirmance. 
The Utah Supreme Court has echoed its holding in Blake in 
Merchants' Credit Bureau v. Kaoru Akiyama, 64 Utah 364, 230 P. 
1017 (1924), in which the court likewise held that a minor who 
has squandered property during his minority is not required to 
restore it in order to effectuate disaffirmance. And# in a case 
somewhat similar to the present, the court held that a minor 
could not be held liable to a seller for damages resulting from 
the minor's disaffirmance of a contract to purchase a house-
trailer. Harvey v. Hadfield. 13 Utah 2d 258, 372 P.2d 985 
(1962). In so holding, the court stated, "[0]ur statute cannot 
be tortured to support the defendant's contention[] that the 
disaffirming minor must compensate him for damages he may have 
incurred." Id. at 987. 
Consequently, Utah law, as established by statute and 
relevant case law, clearly indicates that a minor does not have 
the obligation to return the other party to his pre-contractual 
status. Instead, the minor must merely return to the other party 
that part of the consideration "remaining within his control at 
any time after attaining his majority." U.C.A. § 15-2-2. 
Therefore, in the present case, Defendant complied with Utah 
statutory and case law by returning the truck to Plaintiff. 
Defendant did not have the duty to return the truck in a better 
shape than it was in at the time of the disaffirmance; nor did 
Defendant have the duty to compensate Plaintiff for the 
depreciation and/or rental value of the truck for the time in 
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which Defendant possessed the truck. Instead, as stated in 
Blake, "an adult, in dealing with a minor, assumes all the risk 
of loss." 180 P. at 174. 
In addition to the clarity of Utah law on the point, public 
policy likewise supports the rule as it now stands. Utah's 
courts have recognized the long-standing "responsibility of our 
courts to . . . safeguard [minors'] rights until they have 
attained their majority and thus presumably have the maturity of 
judgment necessary to deal with opposing parties on equal terms 
. . ." Harvey, 372 P.2d at 986. Until such time, "[i]t is fair 
to assume that because of their immaturity they may lack the 
judgment, experience and will power which they should have to 
bind themselves to what may turn out to be burdensome and 
longlasting obligations." Id. "Accordingly, adults dealing with 
minors must be deemed to do so in an awareness of the privilege 
the law affords the minor of disaffirming his contracts." Id. 
In the present case, therefore, Plaintiff is deemed to have 
been aware of the protection the law affords a minor. Plaintiff 
proceeded to enter into a contract with a minor despite that 
protection. Therefore, any losses which Plaintiff may have 
suffered as a result of that contract are likewise his to bear, 
and Defendant does not have the duty to compensate him for those 
losses. Consequently, Defendant cannot be required to compensate 
Plaintiff's claimed losses of $1,160, which has been calculated 
as the amount still owing on the contract after Defendant's 
disaffirmance minus the current market value of the truck. 
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Defendant recognizes that some other states have followed a 
minority rule that differs somewhat from Utah law. For example, 
in the lower court, Plaintiff relied on Arizona and Idaho 
decisions to support his contention that a disaffirming minor is 
required to account for the benefit he has received from the 
adult party. However, reliance on such cases is misguided 
because, first, Arizona does not have a statute on point, and 
second, while Idaho does have a relevant statute, it is entirely 
different from Utah's. Therefore, Utah's statutory and case law, 
while perhaps different from those of other states, is 
controlling in the present case and mandates that Defendant not 
be required to compensate Plaintiff for Plaintiff's losses. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A RETURN OF THE CONSIDERATION 
HE FURNISHED TO PLAINTIFF UNDER THE PRESENT CONTRACT. 
Defendant is clearly entitled to his money back. As the 
Court in Harvey held, "The plaintiff minor having disaffirmed the 
contract [he] is entitled to the return of his money." 372 P.2d 
at 9 87. And as the Court in Blake implied, a minor who becomes 
dissatisfied with his contract can undo the deal and get his 
consideration back. 180 P. 172. Moreover, in neither of these 
cases was the minor's right to a refund conditioned on his 
returning the adult to his pre-contractual status. Similarly, in 
the present case, Defendant has disaffirmed the contract and is 
entitled to a return of the money he spent in consideration of 
the void contract, namely $640, regardless of the fact that 
Defendant does not have the duty to return Plaintiff to his pre-
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contractual status. 
CONCLUSION 
It has been agreed by Plaintiff and by the lower court that 
Defendant appropriately disaffirmed his contract with Plaintiff. 
However, the lower court has erroneously granted Plaintiff's 
Summary Judgment Motion requiring that Defendant compensate 
Plaintiff for damages resulting from the disaffirmance. 
Consequently, the lower court's granting of Plaintiff's Motion 
For Summary Judgment should be reversed, and the lower court 
should be ordered to enter judgment in the amount of $640 for 
Defendant. 
Respectfully submitted this ¥ day of , MH^.^lfx.O , 1993. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DEAN N. ZABtflSKIE 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT 
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APPENDIX 
Utah Code Annotated Section 15-2-2 
15-2-2, Liability for necessaries and on contracts--
Disaffirmance 
A minor is bound not only for reasonable value of 
necessaries but also by his contracts, unless he disaffirms them 
before or within a reasonable time after he attains his majority 
and restores to the other party all money or property received by 
him by virtue of said contracts and remaining within his control 
at any time after attaining his majority. 
A-l 
Pages A-2 through A-3: PlaintifPs Complaint 
BRET B. HICKEN 5391 
TAYLOR, BAKER & HICKEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
275 North Main 
P.O. Box 288 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
(801) 798-3574 
oooOooo 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH, SPANISH FORK DEPARTMENT 
oooOooo 
LARRY SWALBERG, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
TODD HANNEGAN 
2741 West 170 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Defendant. 
oooOooo-
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff and Complains against the 
Defendant and for cause of action alleges: y 
1. The Plaintiff is a resident of Utah County. \r // 
2. The Defendant is a resident of Utah County. 
3. The amount in question is less than $10,0007~ 
4. On October 5, 1990, the Plaintiff entered into a 
written agreement with Defendant wherein Defendant purchased a 1974 
Ford truck from the Plaintiff. 
5. Terms of the agreement were that Defendant paid the 
sum of $640.00 on October 5, 1990. The balance of $1,860.00 would 
be paid by January 1, 1991. 
6. The written agreement further stated that the 
Defendant would not receive title to the truck until the balance 
was paid and that Defendant took the vehicle "as is". 
Page 1 of 2 _ .. ^.
 n . ~ n , ^ 
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# 
7. At the time of the agreement, the Defendant was 17 
years old. Plaintiff had no knowledge of this fact and assumed the 
Defendant had reached the age of majority. 
8. The Plaintiff has made demand for payment or return 
of the truck from the Defendant on several occasions and the 
Defendant has refused. He stated that he was a minor at the time 
of the contract and is, therefore, not responsible. 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff demands Judgment as follows: 
1. For Judgment in the amount of $1,860.00, which 
represents the balance due and owing; or, in the alternative that 
should the contract be determined to be voidable, that the 
Defendant return the vehicle to the Plaintiff and that the 
Defendant be responsible for a reasonable cost for having used said 
vehicle. 
2. For attorney's fees and costs of Court incurred in 
bringing this matter. 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court deems 
just in the premises. 
DATED this 13
 d a y of May. ^ 
BRET B. HICKEN 
TAYLOR, BAKER & HICKEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Page 2 of 2 
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Pages A-4 through A-7: PlaintifPs Memorandum 
in Support of PlaintifPs Motion 
For Summary Judgment 
Bret B. Hicken 5391 
BAKER & HICKEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
40 South Main - Suite 10 
P.O. Box 306 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660-
(801) 798-1800 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH, SPANISH FORK DEPARTMENT 
LARRY SWALBERG, 
VS. 
TODD HANNEGAN, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant, 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 913000020 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Larry Swalberg, by and through 
his attorney, Bret B. Hicken, and hereby submits the following 
Memorandum in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment. 
FACTS 
On October 5, 1990, the Defendant purchased the 1974 Ford 
truck from the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff was unaware that Defendant 
was a minor. Defendant contracted to purchase the vehicle for a 
total purchase price of $2,500'. 00. Of that sum, $640.00 was paid 
from Defendant to Plaintiff, with the balance of $1,860.00 to be 
paid at a later date. Prior to paying the balance of the money, 
Defendant contacted the Plaintiff and indicated he would not honor 
the contract, and further refused to return the vehicle. 
The vehicle was later returned pursuant to an order of 
- 1 -
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the court, but had been severely diminished in value. 
ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment is appropriate in a situation where 
there are no material facts at issue. All facts related above are 
not disputed by either party. The Defendant was a minor when he 
entered into the contract, and disaffirmed before the age of 
majority. However, in this matter, the Defendant obtained the use 
of a vehicle without revealing his age to the Plaintiff, utilized 
that vehicle, damaged the vehicle, and when the vehicle was no 
longer operative, attempted to escape his responsibility. 
To allow the Defendant to take advantage of the Plaintiff 
in this fashion is unconscionable. The appropriate principal is 
stated in 12 A.L.R. 3d §1174, pg. 1182; "In several jurisdictions, 
the absolute immunity of an infant from contract liability has been 
modified to the extent that in an action for recovery of a 
disaffirming minor's payments, the courts have allowed the 
Defendant merchant an offset for the amount by which the property 
is diminished or depreciated while in the minor's possession." It 
goes on further to state that page 1187; "The courts in several 
jurisdictions have permitted the Defendant vendor, in an action 
brought by a minor to recover payments that have been made under a 
disaffirmed contract, to recap an allowance for the reasonable 
rental value or value of the use of the subject matter of the 
contract while it was in the minor's possession." 
The above principal should apply in the case before the 
court. At the time the Defendant took possession of the vehicle, 
- 2 -
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it was worth $2,500.00 (the purchase price agreed to by the 
Defendant). When the property was returned, it was worth 
approximately $700.00 (see attached Affidavit of Randy Brailsford, 
general manager of Smith Auto Ford). 
Such a drastic reduction in value took place while the 
property was in the hands of the Defendant, and it should be his 
responsibility. The bulk of case law, as stated by Defendant in 
his memorandum, requires the Defendant to "restore the property to 
the merchant." Certainly the $700.00 unworking vehicle returned to 
the Plaintiff was not the same vehicle purchased by the Defendant 
for $2,500.00. 
The Court, in Valencia vs. White, 654 P. 2d 287, 174 Ariz. 
139, (Ariz. App. 1982), reviewed a similar question, in a case 
where a minor contracted for repair of trucks in his ownership. 
Upon reaching the age of majority, he disaffirmed the contract. 
The Court stated that upon disaffirming, the minor was required to 
pay any benefits received in order to return both parties to the 
status quo. The Court further stated; "Upon reaching the age of 
majority, the Defendant is required to account for any and all 
benefits he received." 
Additionally, the Court in Clark vs. Stites, 404 P. 2d 
339, 89 Idaho 191 (Idaho 1965), held that: "Notice of a decision 
of minor over 18 years old to disaffirm a contract is not the only 
requirement to accomplish a complete disaffirmance; the minor must 
also restore consideration to the party, or pay its equivalent." 
- 3 -
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CONCLUSION 
The Defendant received a vehicle worth $2,500.00 from the 
Plaintiff. When the Defendant disaffirmed, he returned the vehicle 
worth $700.00 to the Plaintiff. This does not constitute a 
restoration of property on behalf of the Defendant. 
It is reasonable that this Plaintiff be granted judgment 
in the amount of the diminution of value of the property in 
question. 
Summary judgment should be granted in this matter on 
behalf of the Plaintiff in the amount of $1,160.00 (the remaining 
sum due of $1,860.00, less the $700.00 value of the truck) plus 
reasonable amount of attorney's fees incurred in bringing this 
matter. 
Respectfully, the Plaintiff requests relief as mentioned 
above. 
'-? 
DATED this - / day of X" ^^ ' , 1993, 
BRET B. HICKEN, 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing, postage prepaid, to Dean N. Zabriskie, 3507 N. 
University Ave., Suite 370, Jamestown Square, Hanover Building, 
Provo, UT 84604, this / day of A/A/?/J , 1993. 
/L//-/KM// /JMA 
SECRETARY 
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Page A-8: Ruling of the Honorable Judge 
John C. Backlund 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SPANISH FORK DEPARTT'BIT 
RECEIVED 
APR 1 3 1993 
LARRY SWALBERG 
vs 
TODD HANNEGAN 
Plaintiff 
Defendant 
RULING 
CASE NO. S13000020 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Plaintiff is 
entitled to Summary Judgment in the sum of $1,160.00 plus interest and 
court costs. The Court finds there is no genuine dispute as to plaintiff's 
claim for damages in the sum of $1,160.00. While defendant, being a minor, 
exercised his right to disaffirm the contract, he violated his obligation to 
promptly return the vehicle in as good a condition as when he received it. 
This he failed to do. 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
Counsel for plaintiff is directed to prepare an Order and Summary 
Judgment consistent herewith. 
DATED: April 12, 1993 BY THE COURT: 
"d^i^y C^^^^JL 
-itsfis 
/ 
~cr / — -
:' CIRCUIT JUDGE 
^ 
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DEAN N. ZABRISKIE #3599 
Attorney for Defendant 
3507 North University Avenue 
Jamestown Square, Suite 370 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: 375-7680 
FILED 
SEP 13 1993 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LARRY SWALBERG, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TODD HANNEGAN, 
Defendant. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Docket No. 930313 CA 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Brief of the Appellant in the above entitled action to 
Bret B. Hicken at 40 South Main, Suite 10, Spanish Fork, Utah 
84660 in an envelope postage prepaid this .0 day of September, 
1993 addressed as follows: 
Bret B. Hicken 
40 South Main, Suite 10 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
//9 7 
DEAN N. ZABRISKIE 
